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The application of psychology in the 
design of systems is not new, and 
began in earnest after the Second 
World War with the formation of the 
Human Factors Society in the USA 
and the Ergonomics Society in the 
UK. What has changed very 
recently is the growing interest in 
the area of engineering psychology, 
as exemplified by a number of new 
developments. These include the 
1st International Conference on 
Engineering Psychology and 
Cognitive Ergonomics held at 
Stratford-upon-Avon, UK, in 
October 1996, the formation of a 
Special Interest Group on 
Engineering Psychology within the 
British Psychological Society, and 
the launch of a new US journal in 
1997-the Inteynational Joumal of 
Cogaitive Eygonomics. This article 
considers some of the major 
accidents which have occurred in 
recent years, and the contribution 
which engineering psychology 
makes to designing systems and 
enhancing safety. 
n 1979, one of the most serious nuclear accidents 
occurred at Three Mile Island in the USA. For two 
hours and IS minutes, the flow of coolant water to I the main pumps was interrupted, and the plant 
operators realised that they were facing the possibility of 
a meltdown or at the very least an escape of radiation into 
the environment. The emergency continued for over 16 
hours; there was no loss of life, but a small amount of 
radioactive material was released into the atmosphere, 
and the cost to the operating companies and insurers was 
estimated to be in the region of $1 billion. 
One December night in 1984, a gas leak from a small 
pesticide plant devastated the city of Bhopal in India. The 
company, owned by a subsidiary of the Union Carbide 
Corporation, was manufacturing the chemical ‘methyl 
isocyanate’, and the initial cause of the accident was 
thought to be an influx of water into a methyl isocyanate 
storage tank. At least 2500 people were killed, and more 
than 200000 were injured. 
In March 1987, the passenger and freight ferry Herald 
of Fwe EYzterprise was making a routine cross-channel 
journey from Zeebrugge to Dover. Tu’enty minutes later, 
the ferry capsized, sinking in less than two minutes; 150 
passengers and 38 crew lost their lives. 
The above were all major disasters and, like Challenger, 
Chernobyl, the King’s Cross fire and others, they are 
infrequent, unusual and unlikely to occur in exactly the 
same way again. Paradoxically, the outcome of many 
catastrophic events is that the situation is then far safer. 
After the experience at Three Mile Island, the design and 
procedures at nuclear power plants were extensively 
reviewed, with the result that nuclear power in the USA 
is now far safer today than it was at the time of the 
accident. These well-documented major events tend to 
become headline news and are usually followed by 
national inquiries into their causes in order to make 
recommendations to avoid similar incidents happening in 
the future. Inevitably, the reasons why these accidents 
occurred has to be attributed somewhere along the line to 
the fallibility of humans, since the systems are designed, 
managed and maintained by us. 
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Humans are creative: they attempt to make sense of the 
world by making inferences, solving problems and 
drawing conclusions. This capability together with our 
ability to adapt partly explains why we have been so 
The Three Mile Island incident is, not unusual in this 
respect: an analysis of other major incidents would 
indicate similar explanations. For example. Reason's 
comprehensive review and documentation of Bhopal, 
Challenger. Chernobyl, Zeebrugge and King's Cross3 
successful in our indicated contributing 
environment. But in conditions and latent 
achieving this, we also failures resulting from 
make errors. Most poor design, in- 
errors are inconse- sufficient training, 
quential with no inadequate proce- 
lasting effects, some dures, system design 
become positive events (hardware and soft- 
in that we learn from mare) and regulatory, 
the situation and thus nianagement, and 
avoid repeating the operational failures, as 
error and precipitating well as communication 
the accident (the so- and maintenance prob- 
called 'near miss') and lems. However, there is 
always the difficulty some have disastrous Nuclear Dower station at Three Mile Island. USA . .  . 
consequences. when considering- 
Although it is generally recognised that human error 
cannot be prevented, and some would argue that it would 
not be desirable to do so,' we do know that the systems 
we use need to be well designed. Poor designs, for 
example, often do not take account of basic principles 
such as visibility, providing information about the 
affordances, possibilities and limitations of operation, 
and utilising natural mappings. 
During the Three Mile Island incident, the operators 
failed to recognise that the pilot-operated relief valve was 
jammed open for more than two hours; the resulting 
water loss subsequently damaged the reactor, as it was 
supposed to open, relieve the pressure and then close 
automatically. In the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) accident report, the failure to diagnose this was 
explained as being due to the poorly designed control 
panel containing hundreds of alarms not organised in a 
logical manner. At the start of the problem, more than 100 
alarms were activated with no means of suppressing 
the unimportant ones, and operators had to scan 1600 
windows and gauges. Not only were the operators subject 
to an overload of information, several of the instruments 
went off scale making them impossible to read. This 
desperate situation was exacerbated by a printer failure, 
which resulted in loss of data and, when restored, a hard 
copy printout running more than two hours behind 
events. 
The NRC accident report included the following: 
- 
latent fdilures of deciding how far back in the time frame 
to consider. This is important given that a catastrophic 
event arises from the coming together of several causal 
chains, where the elimination of any one would have 
deflected the sequence of events leading to the incident.3 
In terms of demonstrating this, it may be useful to 
consider Zeebrugge, which could be described as an 
example of an accident waiting to happen, i.e. there were 
a nuniber of resident pathogens al.ready in place before 
that fateful day when the ferry set sail. For example, it 
could be suggested that the precursors of the accident 
started years ago with the design of the 'roll-oniroll-off' 
ferries themselves. These were designed for fast turn- 
around times, maximum profit and to load and unload 
vehicles as quickly as possible: bow doors open, cars 
drive in, doors close, ferry departs. Subsequently, their 
design was essentially a huge, great hull, which only 
needed a foot of water across the deck and the whole 
structure would turn over. Despite this, the design was 
accepted by the industry and roll-on/roll-off ferries 
became operational. 
Admittedly, there were some concerns voiced at the 
time, but other designs were reje'cted primarily on the 
basis of cost. Further, a few weeks before the Zeebrugge 
accident, it was actually suggested to the Board of 
Directors that a light should be installed to indicate 
whether the bow doors were a'pen or closed. This 
proposal was rejected, again on a cost basis. The owners 
had therefore made two decisions: one, to accept the roll- 
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ordroll-off design, and two, not to fit the warning 
ights. 
There were also problems with the management of the 
ferries: people were working double shifts, the boats were 
undermanned, and seemingly driven by profit-making 
over and above safety. The ferries had built up a culture 
of job demarcation; it was subsequently found that the 
person who was supposed to make sure the bow doors 
were closed was asleep in his bunk when the ferry left 
harbour, having just finished working a double shift. 
However, this was not an issue at the time of the 
accident-the ferries often left harbour with the doors 
still open. The crew would frequently close them as the 
ferry was leaving, and they had done this on many 
occasions without consequences. 
On that fateful day in March 1987, the seas were 
choppy, the bow doors were open and water started to 
flood in. One deck hand noticed, but took the line that it 
was not their job, but someone else’s. The layers of 
resident pathogens (i.e. the roll-oniroll-off design), poor 
safety culture (i.e. the negative reporting system), and 
poor management procedures (i.e. leaving port with the 
doors open) had effectively produced an operation 
‘riddled with holes’. Reason described this in his 
‘dynamics of accident causation’ model, where a number 
of latent and active failures come together to produce the 
‘impossible’ accident. These failures are indicated by the 
‘holes’ on the model shown in Fig. 1. Although it might 
seem unlikely that a number of events would occur in 
order to create an accident (demonstrated by the holes 
lining up in the model) this can happen, as the Zeebrugge 
accident indicated. 
A further point concerns who gets the blame. 
Typically, the people who are prosecuted are the 
individuals who committed the active errors on the day of 
the disaster. We tend not to look back in time to the people 
who designed the ferry, and the work procedures. The 
last person to be involved with the system tends to be the 
one who is blamed; in the Zeebrugge example, this was 
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the person who failed to close the bow 
doors quickly enough. So what is the 
outcome? Often what happens is these 
individuals are taken to court, or 
prevented from having contact with 
operating the system in the belief that all 
is safe again. But it is not. The holes are 
still there, and undoubtedly people will 
make the errors again. 
Contribution of psychology 
Analyses of the cause of each of the 
cases mentioned above would indicate 
that the accident arose from a number of 
failures. These came from anv one of a 
training of personnel, to the culture of the organisation, 
and human error resulting from poor decision-making at 
either a managerial andor  a lower level. It could therefore 
be concluded that accidents, and probably incidents, are 
multi-causal. However, this multi-faceted nature of the 
situation makes prediction of incident and accidents 
difficult, if not impossible. What then is the way forward? 
All of the aforementioned systems involved people, 
and with even the most advanced technologies, humans 
have some degree of contact with the system. This may 
be during development and/or at the operational stage, if 
only to retain control of pressing the abort button in 
highly automated systems. Therefore, it would seem 
imperative to consider the role of the human, their 
capabilities and limitations, and characteristics in terms 
of psychological, physiological and social needs. Given 
the complexity of work situations, it is not only the actual 
interface between the user and the equipment which 
needs to be considered, but also the design of the 
workplace, operational procedures, the working environ- 
ment and the culture of the organisation. This extends to 
encompass communication between individuals, their 
training needs, and the selection and recruitment of 
personnel. 
Given the complexity of designing systems, there is 
likely to be a range of solutions from the retrospectively 
obvious to the diverse. A starting point might be to 
consider human error. This is an area which has been 
well researched by psychologists, although we are still 
some way from having a real, in-depth understanding of 
human error, and even the development of a precise 
definition continues to prove to be a difficult and elusive 
goal. As errors can arise because of a person’s judgment 
in a specific situation, they cannot be defined objectively 
by considering the performance of humans or equipment 
in isolation. Furthermore, errors are caused not only by 
changes in performance with respect to the norm, but 
also by changes in the criteria of judgments. If we 








number of situations ranging from the 
design Of the equipment, the work system, 
operating procedures, selection and accident causation’ model3 
I 
Fig. 1 ‘Swiss cheese’ accident model, based on Reason’s ‘dynamics of 
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Herald of Free 
E?iterprise. 
Zeebrugge, Belgium 
of a set of human actions exceeds some limit of 
acceptability', it is possible to view it as on out-of- 
tolerance action, where the limits are defined by the 
particular system. However, human responses are subject 
to fluctuations or variations with respect to speed and 
accuracy. Kjellenl put forward the hypothesis that an 
error or incident arises when the fluctuations exceed a 
boundary set by the working conditions. According to 
this model, the probability of a human error is depmdent 
on the distribution of the fluctuation and the tolerance 
limits of the system. In this sense. errors are lawful in that 
they are predictable. 
Complex cognitive tasks require optimisation on 
several criteria, and are subject to time-variant character- 
istics. Often there is no right or wrong decision, only the 
best decision for any given set of characteristics at a 
specific point in time. The outcome in terms of successful 
decision-making and avoidance of errors is often not 
known until later. When considering methodologies for 
studying errrr, this is very different from studying 
behaviour based on simple, rule-directed decisions. 
Laboratory studies of human error and post hoc analyses 
of incidents which involve collecting individual accounts/ 
reactions etc. are often not fruitful in terms of yielding 
definitive information about the causes of making 
errors. Consequently, the most frequently-used methods 
lor studying errors are observation and self-report 
techniques, and analyses of accident data.' 
In summary, the complexities of human behaviour 
make studying human error a challenging task with 
many difficult theoretical and methodological problems. 
There currently exists no single theory or model for 
predicting the occurrence of human errors, and which 
would provide an initial step towards learning more 
about the causes and the prevention of errors. Conse- 
quently, when designing systems, failure to know in 
detail why a human error occurs makes the development 
of a solution strategy both difficult and inefficient. In 
some safety-critical applications, there are also specific 
difficulties associated with studying human error due to 
the catastrophic nature of an accident when it occurs. As 
a result, evidence about the cause(s) of the accident may 
be lost and the main participants may be deceased, thus 
hampering the search for the causes of the errors. 
esi 
One common viewpoint is that human errors arise 
because of a mismatch between the human and the task 
or human-machine misfits.' Frequent misfits are likely to 
he considered design errors, while occasional misfits may 
arise due to variability on the part of the system 
(component failures) or the human (human errors). Both 
external and internal factors may be responsible for this 
mismatch, although it is generally thought that internal 
traits, e.g. skill levels, are not as influential as external 
factors in their contribution to human error. External 
performance shaping factors of relevance here might 
include: (i) inadequate human engineering design, e.g. 
violation of population stereotypes resulting in sequence 
and selection errors; (ii) inadequate work space and work 
layout, which may contribute towards fatigue, decreased 
productivity and increased errors; and (iii) inadequate job 
aids, e.g. poorly written manuals and procedures, which 
may lead to uncertainty and errors on the part of the 
operator. 
There are various strategies which can be employed to 
try to reduce the opportunities for human error, both 
within the finer details of the system design and those 
factors external to the system but directly relevant to its 
smooth functioning. In the first instance, the system 
should be designed in order to minimise the likelihood of 
errors occurring. When they do arise, it is important that 
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they are reduced to a tolerable level in order to lessen their 
impact on the system. Conseyuently, the recommendation 
is that errors should be reduced or eliminated through 
early detection. 
With existing systems, an ergonomic audit involving 
a detailed analysis of procedures, operations and 
equipment design, in conjunction with studying the 
capabilities of intended users, may be needed in order 
to find the ‘weaknesses’, where human error is liable to 
occur. In addition, it is often useful for workers and 
experts to examine the work cycle in order to identify 
situations and processes likely to create errors. Outside 
the immediate operation of the system, there are various 
job supporting activities which might lead indirectly to a 
reduction in error rate. Continued training, refresher 
cuurses and simulator tasks may contribute towards 
reducing errors as workers are likely to gain from having 
time to reflect on new situations and review their 
performance. 
Many human errors arise because of incompatibility 
between equipment design, proceduresitraining and 
achievable human performance. It is reasonable to 
assume that, as long as there is a human in the system 
cycle. the elimination of human error-related accidents is 
an impossible and unobtainable goal. A general design 
principle might be therefore to make systems error- 
tolerant! Interfaces should also be designed taking into 
account ergonomic principles. Some examples might 
include: 
The system and its components should be consistent 
and compatible with the users’ expectations and 
mental models; the state of the system should always 
be unambiguously clear to the operator in order to 
reduce the occurrence of mode errors. Errors may be 
avoided through the careful and informed design of 
controls, displays and operational procedures. 
The system response should be reversible and observ- 
able to the operators. Making the error more evident 
can be advantageous, e.g. programming errors in the 
lateral navigation ol the Boeing 7571767 aircraft are 
shown instantly. If it is not possible to make actions 
reversible. they should be made ‘difficult’ to carry out 
in order to prevent unintentional performance. 
Systems should be designed to experience graceful 
degradation instead of total failure in response to a 
critical human error-an approach which has been 
used by NASA for many years. In this situation, back- 
ups or ‘hot spares’ (where equipment is kept running 
in case it is needed) are always available. 
Redundancy should be built into critical operations. 
Human performance can be monitored in order to 
verify that tasks are carried out correctly and at the 
appropriate times. It is rare (but not impossible) that a 
single error will precipitate a fatal incident. A lot of 
checks, redundant actions, reinforced with safety rules 
will ensure that several serious errors would have to be 
made in succession for a disaster to occur. 
The ability of humans to adapt to situations has already 
been established as a positive hunian attribute; however, 
one of the drawbacks of this human trait is that we will 
adapt to poor designs. Equipment alone cannot protect 
against all potential types of human error: selection and 
training, procedures, support documentation, good 
communications and management plus operator self- 
knowledge are essential considerations in an error- 
tolerant system. When considering ways of alleviating 
human error, the recommendation is that the whole 
system including all the peripheral accompanying 
aspects is studied. 
Conclusions 
Accidents are usually multi-causal, and the resident 
pathogens in the design and operation of human-machine 
systems can lead to devastating consequences not only 
Emergency services at 
King’s Cross fire 
the 
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to be confused or make mistakes using the everyday 
objects which surround us: doors, telephones, video 
recorders, light switches, oven controls-the list is 
endless. But, how often do we try to push doors which 
need to be pulled? And when faced with a row of 
identical toggle switches, how often do we turn off the 
required light? When reprogramming the bedside 
clock radio, how many of us are faced with a bank of 
identical controls with no obvious clues to their 
different functions? 
We all experience frequent difficulties manipulating 
objects in our everyday life, but is there any 
commonality with what happens in this context and 
in major disasters? 
Prof. Donald Norman, Director of the Institute for 
Cognitive Science at the University of California, has 
written a number of books on the design of everyday 
objects, and in one he considers door design? Norman 
argues that a door poses only two essential questions: in 
which direction does it move? on which side should one 
work it? And when faced with a door, the answers to these 
two questions should be immediately obvious, with no 
need for words or symbols, or trial and error. 
Well-designed objects are 'visible': they have cues 
which make them easy to use, while poorly-designed 
objects lack these cues or give out information which is 
misleading. In fact, Norman suggests that doors which 
need to be labelled with their mode of operation are 
invariably poorly designed for human use. A trivial 
example perhaps, for what does it tell us about the design 
of more complex and advanced technological systems? 
Well, there is one message it conveys-if we cannot get 
the design of a public door right for human use, what 
hope for the operation of advanced technologies? 
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